Research

Abstract: In this experimental article, the author investigates the impact of multiple contacts on collusive behavior in various strategic environments. Contrary to the theoretical expectations that collusion incentives would increase with multiple interactions, the study finds no significant increase in collusion in either symmetric or asymmetric environments. Instead, there is a notable increase in defection in all points of contact within the symmetric environment. Although overall collusion did not increase, the experiment revealed a change in the mechanism that sustains collusion, particularly in asymmetric payoff situations. Specifically, defection at one interaction point leads to a higher likelihood of future punishment at another point under multiple contacts. Additionally, the author adapts popular strategies to condition on the history observed across multiple interaction points and observes that subjects employed these modified strategies in the asymmetric environment. These effects of multiple contacts can be partially explained by the concept of risk dominance.

Abstract: People belong to many different groups, and few belong to the same network of groups.  Moreover, people routinely reduce their involvement in dysfunctional groups while increasing involvement in those they find more attractive. The net effect can be an increase in overall cooperation and the partial isolation of free-riders, even if free-riders are never punished, excluded, or recognized. We formalize and test this conjecture with an agent-based social simulation and a multi-good extension of the standard repeated public goods game. The experiment places 16 subjects in two four-person groups arranged in a 16-group checkerboard lattice that ensures no two subjects share membership in more than one group. Our initial results from fifteen sessions (five in each of three different treatments) strongly suggest that multi-group settings can indeed raise overall cooperation and reduce the impact of free-riders. We extend our understanding of this setting by imposing greater heterogeneity between groups through interweaving AI players amongst the human subjects; whereby initial sessions of this amplify the aforementioned effects.

Abstract: In this experimental paper, the author investigates the framing effect of different representations of multiple strategic settings or games on a player's strategic behavior. Two representations of the same environment are employed, wherein a player engages in two infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. In the first representation (termed Split), the stage games are shown separately. In contrast, the second representation (termed Linked) displays a combined stage game. The choice bracketing, distinguishing between Narrow and Broad bracketing, is considered a potential cause behind any disparity in behavior between the two representations. The Split representation does not necessitate broad bracketing, whereas the Linked representation compels it. Each type of bracketing has its own equilibrium implications. The author employs both a between-subject design (Study 1), where each subject observes only one representation, and a within-subject design (Study 2), where each subject is shown both the Linked and Split representations. In Study 1, significant differences in average behavior between the two representations are observed for both symmetric and asymmetric payoffs, albeit only after conditioning for session fixed effects. Study 2 reveals a more prominent effect of representation, and a sequence effect is observed, wherein the tendency to defect in both games is higher in the Linked representation if administered after the Split representation. In Study 2, for individuals who cannot be categorized as broad bracketers, the effect of seeing the Linked representation instead of the Split representation is economically significant. It increases the probability of choosing to cooperate in both games by more than 20% and decreases the probability of defecting in both games by more than 25%.

Abstract: We study how well people are able to solve pure coordination problems in time. We introduce treatments that include a visual signal (meant to mimic a clock) and assess the extent to which coordination improves when access to the clock is provided via different institutions. A publicly provided signal outperforms a variety of privately provided alternatives.

Abstract: This paper studies R&D incentives of a non-producing firm in an upstream-downstream structure for three types of technologies, viz., upstream technology, downstream technology and common technology. We consider both the cases of exogenous and endogenous innovation, and the case when common technology innovation leads to spillovers. Our results are then compared and contrasted with those when an insider (i.e., upstream or downstream) firm is engaged in research. The size of the innovation can be larger compared to the third firm R&D case. While there can be a conflict between private and socially optimal choice of technology, we show that socially optimal choice is implementable.