Research

Working Paper

Do Multiple Contacts Matter? (R & R at International Journal of Industrial Organization)

Abstract: I experimentally investigate collusive behavior under simultaneous interaction in multiple strategic settings, a phenomenon which I call multiple contacts. When agents interact in multiple settings, even if defection or deviation from collusion in one setting can not be credibly punished in the same setting, it might be punished in other settings. This theoretically increases the incentive to collude. I study this phenomenon using a laboratory experiment using multiple symmetric or asymmetric prisoner's dilemma games. I observe a statistically significant increase in the probability of punishment in one game after defection in another game under multiple contacts, but only when the games are asymmetric in payoffs. However, I do not find any significant increase in collusion due to multiple contacts in either symmetric or asymmetric environment. In addition to this result, to find further support for the theory which suggests that agents should use different strategies under multiple contacts, I estimate the underlying strategies that subjects use in my experiment. To this end, I modify popular strategies (e.g., Grim Trigger, Tit-for-Tat, etc.) to condition on the history observed in multiple strategic settings. My strategy estimation results show that only for games with asymmetric payoffs subjects use these modified strategies in the presence of multiple contacts.

How Personalized Networks Can Limit Free-riding: A Multi-group Version of the Public Goods Game

(Joint work with Aaron S. Berman, and Dr. Laurence R. Iannaccone)

Abstract: People belong to many different groups, and few belong to the same network of groups.  Moreover, people routinely reduce their involvement in dysfunctional groups while increasing involvement in those they find more attractive. The net effect can be an increase in overall cooperation and the partial isolation of free-riders, even if free-riders are never punished, excluded, or recognized. We formalize and test this conjecture with an agent-based social simulation and a multi-good extension of the standard repeated public goods game. The experiment places 16 subjects in two four-person groups arranged in a 16-group checkerboard lattice that ensures no two subjects share membership in more than one group. Our initial results from fifteen sessions (five in each of three different treatments) strongly suggest that multi-group settings can indeed raise overall cooperation and reduce the impact of free-riders. We extend our understanding of this setting by imposing greater heterogeneity between groups through interweaving AI players amongst the human subjects; whereby initial sessions of this amplify the aforementioned effects.

Representation and Bracketing in Repeated Games

Abstract: In this experimental paper, the author investigates the framing effect of different representations of multiple strategic settings or games on a player's strategic behavior. Two representations of the same environment are employed, wherein a player engages in two infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. In the first representation (termed Split), the stage games are shown separately. In contrast, the second representation (termed Linked) displays a combined stage game. The choice bracketing, distinguishing between Narrow and Broad bracketing, is considered a potential cause behind any disparity in behavior between the two representations. The Split representation does not necessitate broad bracketing, whereas the Linked representation compels it. Each type of bracketing has its own equilibrium implications. The author employs both a between-subject design (Study 1), where each subject observes only one representation, and a within-subject design (Study 2), where each subject is shown both the Linked and Split representations. In Study 1, significant differences in average behavior between the two representations are observed for both symmetric and asymmetric payoffs, albeit only after conditioning for session fixed effects. Study 2 reveals a more prominent effect of representation, and a sequence effect is observed, wherein the tendency to defect in both games is higher in the Linked representation if administered after the Split representation. In Study 2, for individuals who cannot be categorized as broad bracketers, the effect of seeing the Linked representation instead of the Split representation is economically significant. It increases the probability of choosing to cooperate in both games by more than 20% and decreases the probability of defecting in both games by more than 25%.

Publication

R&D Incentives in an Upstream-Downstream Structure, Indian Economic Review (2016): 43-68

(Master's Thesis, under the supervision of Dr. Tarun Kabiraj, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata)

Abstract: This paper studies R&D incentives of a non-producing firm in an upstream-downstream structure for three types of technologies, viz., upstream technology, downstream technology and common technology. We consider both the cases of exogenous and endogenous innovation, and the case when common technology innovation leads to spillovers. Our results are then compared and contrasted with those when an insider (i.e., upstream or downstream) firm is engaged in research. The size of the innovation can be larger compared to the third firm R&D case. While there can be a conflict between private and socially optimal choice of technology, we show that socially optimal choice is implementable. 

Work in Progress

Cooperation in Stochastic Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Asymmetric Payoffs

(Joint work with Dr. Yaroslav Rosokha)

Large All-Pay Team Contests: How Underdog Teams Win

(Joint work with Dr. Brian Roberson)

Team Composition and Cooperation in Queueing Systems

(Joint work with Dr. Yaroslav Rosokha, and Dr. Masha Shunko)

Coordination in Time

(Joint work with Dr. Lars Boerner, and Dr. Erik Kimbrough)